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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: FOUNDATIONS OF 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
SERGIO PUIG* 
“obligations that exist, but cannot be enforced, are ghosts . . . 
elusive to the grasp.” 
―Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores a fundamental aspect of modern international 
investment law:  its remedy to enforce a breach.  I argue that investor-
state arbitration is subject to different conceptualizations that may 
animate the way in which adjudicators understand what type of right is 
conferred to investors when granted the invocation of responsibility 
against a host state.  I explore the consequences of the three distinct 
conceptualizations (i.e., direct right, beneficiary right, or agency) by 
reference to the current debate regarding to whom countermeasures are 
opposable under international law.  I show how the three dimensions 
imply that the construction of substantive law entails important 
assumptions about the procedures that will apply when that substantive 
law is ultimately enforced.  In this sense, the Article evidences some of the 
methodological limitations of the ‘procedural-substantive’ distinction 
often encountered in international law analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall observed that a government 
cannot be called a “government of laws, and not of men . . . if the 
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”1  
Justice Marshall’s celebrated quote is more than a modest reminder 
that in any given legal system there is no right without a remedy.  It 
is a restatement that when governments themselves violate legal 
rights, it is especially important to furnish a remedy. 
To be sure, legal scholars agree that providing remedies to the 
victims of violations of rights after the fact—whether this law is 
domestic or international—is an imperfect solution at best. 
However, the disagreement seems to emerge generally once 
lawyers and legal scholars attempt to define what is the chief goal 
of a particular legal remedy.  For instance, a remedy plausibly 
provides reparation in certain instances or the opportunity to 
ventilate grievances in other situations.  Ideally, backward-looking 
remedies can deter future violations.  In theory, if government 
officials or agencies know that they will be held to account, they 
will be less likely to commit violations in the first place.  More 
                                                     
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
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broadly, remedies perform an important expressive function:  they 
drive home the idea that the law takes violations seriously. 
As investor-state arbitration becomes the dominant remedy to 
enforce international investment obligations, it is important to ask 
the following questions:  What is the primary purpose of investor-
state arbitration?  And, how the different functional 
conceptualizations of investor-state arbitration would—in 
practice—interact with the rights conferred under international 
law?  The two fundamental questions may be at the crux of one of 
the main debates of the field, as can be discerned from recent cases 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). 
In this essay, I analyze an external face and fundamental part of 
international investment law:  its remedy to enforce a breach.  I 
argue that the remedy is subject to different conceptualizations that 
may affect the way in which adjudicators understand what type of 
right (i.e., direct rights, beneficiary rights, or agency) is conferred to 
investors when granted the direct invocation of responsibility 
against a host state.  I do so by reference to the debate around the 
operation of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness for the 
breach of an investment treaty by characterizing a conduct as a 
countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state. 
Or—in more simple terms—the debate regarding to whom 
international countermeasure are opposable.  Using this debate, I 
show that the different justifications relied upon to promote 
investor-state arbitration as the main remedy of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) allow at least three different 
understandings of that question and, by implication, different 
relational dimensions of remedy.  These different 
conceptualizations emphasize investor-state arbitration as enabling 
(primarily) one of the following functions of legal remedies:  (a) 
procedural justice; (b) corrective justice; or (c) deterrence. 
Before proceeding, a cautionary note is in order:  the analysis in 
this essay provides an opportunity to examine whether and how 
the invocation of responsibility by a non-state actor against a host 
state can be conceptualized in different ways and some of the 
consequences thereof.  Whether the interpretation of the rights 
should be necessarily determined by such conceptualization, as a 
starting point, is a different question.  This is ultimately a matter of 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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treaty interpretation.2  However, for the purpose of this Article, 
and in no way dismissing the issues noted above, a lack of 
interpretative guidance in the relevant treaty will be taken for 
granted.  Not only is the interpretative guidance of BITs on this 
issue generally unclear, but it is in these situations that 
adjudicators may reveal their assumptions of a remedy. As I hope 
to illustrate, this is not to say that the different conceptual 
foundations do not affect—consciously or unconsciously—the 
interpretative function performed by arbitrators. 
The Article begins with a brief discussion of the intellectual 
justifications and legal ideas behind investor-state arbitration.  It 
continues with a main analysis that unpacks three different 
justifications for allowing the invocation of responsibility to a non-
state actor directly against a state before an arbitral forum.  The 
Article concludes by surveying the debate around the 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness showing how, at the crux 
of it, there is a fundamental disagreement on the main goal of 
investor-state arbitration and explaining how this insight can be 
applied to other, similar debates.  By engaging with such debates 
from this perspective—more broadly—I seek to illustrate why the 
procedural dimension of international investment law (remedy) 
cannot be completely detached from its substantive connotations 
(rights). 
2. ORIGINS:  A PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONALIST ENTERPRISE 
The end of World War II, the dissolution of empires, and the 
decolonization process brought a stronger need for a legal system 
of protection of foreign direct investment (FDI).  This need arose at 
a time when a dialogue between two distinct legal conceptions was 
heavily influencing international law.3  On the one hand, legal 
positivism—whose adherents included primarily European civil 
law scholars—argued for the separation of law and morality and 
                                                     
2 See Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of 
State Responsibility, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 626 (2013) (arguing that the choice 
between direct rights and agency approaches is a matter of treaty interpretation). 
3 See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. 
ECON. J. 644, 645–47 (1989) (distinguishing between legal positivists from natural 
law theorists in the context of understanding the development of commercial 
law).  For a more complete discussion on the background of ICSID, please refer to 
Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’S Legitimacy Debate: Towards A Goal-Based Empirical 
Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 465 (2013). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/4
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considered the law as being posited by lawmakers.4  On the other 
hand, natural law theory as presented in a more secular form 
adopted a different view. Natural law theorists, developed largely 
out of the common law tradition (which historically resisted the 
separation of morality and law), championed legal processes and 
institutional order as essential components of a market-based 
society.5  Under both traditions, the law serves an important 
coordinative function by providing a framework against which 
individuals and organizations might orient actions as well as 
rationally evaluate interactions with others and plan ahead.6 
These two conceptions of law (legal positivism and secularized 
naturalism) dominated Western legal jurisprudence in the 1960’s. 
Inspired by H. L. A. Hart and the legal philosophy of Lon L. Fuller, 
and profoundly located within classical liberalism’s traditional 
emphasis of liberty and freedom, these conceptions may have 
influenced the creation of some important international law 
initiatives of that time.7  Among other influences, legal forms 
experienced a process of assimilation of instrumentalism and 
formalism.  In its final analysis it meant that international legal 
orders were not only the way to subject human conduct to the 
governance of legitimate rules, but also to limit evil regimes from 
implementing substantially unjust laws that curtail liberties, 
                                                     
4 See generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 599 (1958) (defending legal positivism from critics); Stanley L. 
Paulson, Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, 18 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 153 (1998) (identifying key claims and evolution of legal 
positivism). 
5 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 145 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[L]aw [is] . . . 
a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, insight, 
intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of 
this dependence, to fall always somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals.”); 
Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 379 (1946) 
(suggesting that natural law refers to the belief that there are external criteria 
“found in the conditions required for successful group living” against which a 
judge can evaluate his decision). 
6 In secularized individualistic societies, certainty, objectivity and neutrality 
tend to be important constitutive values.  See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the 
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2008) (“Law in the first sense requires the 
existence of certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for people’s 
behavior, as well as a basis for decision by the courts.”). 
7 See David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 
27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 19–20 (2005) (“Experts argue for their preferred policy or 
doctrinal choice by reference to broader theories, methods and political commitments 
which they associate with the doctrine or policy they prefer.  For lawyers, these 
can be theories of law—positivism, naturalism, sociology . . . .”). 
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including economic ones.  Individual rights represented a form of 
empowerment to liberate the individual from the state’s 
subjugation, as well as to enable direct enforcement of such 
substantive ends of the law.8  For the development of the 
international law applicable to investors abroad, the result of this 
process of assimilation was the revival of a procedural functionalist 
enterprise with, among others, the following features: 
(1) a predominant concern for individual rights and 
protection of property; 
(2) rules enforced by the victims backed by treaties or 
reciprocal agreements; 
(3) standard adjudicative procedures established to avoid 
the escalation of violence; 
(4) offenses treated as torts punishable by economic 
reparation; 
(5) strong incentives for the culprit to yield to the 
prescribed decision due to threat of international ostracism; 
and 
(6) legal change via an evolutionary process of developing 
interpretations, customs and norms.9 
3. FUNCTION OF REMEDY:  THREE DIFFERENT GOALS 
Investor-state arbitration is the poster-child of international 
legalization, a phenomenon salient in modern international 
economic relations.10  The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or the “Centre”), one of the five 
organizations of the World Bank (“WB”), can be credited with the 
                                                     
8 This rhetoric not only makes it hard to assess questions of distribution 
among favored and less favored rights holders. See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY 188 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 
1967) (“The development of legally regulated relationships . . . is usually regarded 
as signifying a decrease of constraint and an increase of individual freedom.”). 
9 For a similar argument, see BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: 
JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 21 (1990).  
10 For an analysis of the different perspectives on legalization and the 
theoretical puzzles that legalization poses for international institutions, see Judith 
Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385, 386 
(2000) (“These actions, taken in the course of a single year, were representative of 
a longer term trend: some international institutions are becoming increasingly 
legalized.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/4
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rapid expansion and popularity of investor-state arbitration as 
primary remedy to address conflicts over investments abroad.11 
The signing of the ICSID Convention and the creation of the 
Centre not only gave origin to an international organization 
specializing in international investment disputes settlement (i.e., 
ICSID), but it also facilitated the expansion and popularization of a 
system of protections for foreign investors based on a remedy for 
damages directly enforceable by individuals or corporations 
against states (i.e., private right of action).  More importantly, the 
Convention and the Centre served to promote a particular 
understanding of the role of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in 
national economic development, to stabilize a vision of economic 
cooperation, and to advance—especially, after the Soviet 
collapse—an idea of an international “rule of law” via BITs.12 
Without being exhaustive, what follows is a brief recounting of 
some legalization efforts prior to the signing of the ICSID 
Convention.  These efforts contextualize the three justificatory 
functions of investor-state arbitration as remedy of choice for the 
enforcement of international investment agreements. 
3.1. Background 
Prior to the 1960’s, international investment dispute settlement 
looked different and was heavily dependent on traditionally 
mercantilist relationships.13  In other words, in contrast with the 
current “hybrid,” decentralized, and increasingly privatized 
system, international adjudication was built around inter-state 
relations.14 
                                                     
11 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  The five organizations of the World 
Bank (“WB”) group are: International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (“IBRD”), International Development Association (“IDA”), and 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). 
12 See generally Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” 
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 253–83 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
13 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 173–75 (2005) (noting that one 
innovation of ICSID Convention was the possibility of investor-state arbitration). 
14 See generally Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 184–289 (2003) (discussing the choice of law 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Conflicts over the treatment of property of nationals abroad 
have existed—at least—since the growing strength of a bourgeois 
merchant class in England and the Netherlands succeeded in the 
chartering of trade companies for overseas expansion.  This victory 
gave rise to a mercantilist expansion in the early 17th century.15  
Conflicts then were resolved by some of the methods relied upon 
today (e.g., negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and 
adjudication) as well as some other methods that are no longer 
permissible under international law (e.g., armed interventions for 
the collection of debts or privateers authorized by a government by 
letters of marquee).16 
Foreign investments were put to international adjudication—at 
least—as early as the end of the eighteenth century, when mixed 
arbitral commissions under Jay’s Treaty of 1794 addressed the 
settlement of debts to British creditors.17  Since then, Mixed Claims 
Commissions and ad hoc Tribunals (e.g., France–Venezuela, Iran–
United States, United States–Germany, Mexico–United States, or 
Iran–United States) developed as an alternative to a centralized 
international judicial system.  These commissions expanded until 
the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (“FCNs”) 
started providing for state-to-state dispute resolution by the 
International Court of Justice after the World-War II.18  Provisions 
                                                     
problems related to jurisdictional conflicts between tribunals established by 
treaties, and those constituted pursuant contract). 
15 See Anoush Khoshkish, International Law of Investment: An Overview, 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECON. (2012), http://www.globalpoliticaleconomy.com/
art_intlaw.html (“[T]he British East India Company, 1600; the Dutch East India 
Company, 1602; the United East India Company (Dutch), 1602; the Dutch West 
India Company, 1621; and a number of others which had varying degrees of 
success depending on the territories they were targeting.”).  
16 Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the 
Recovery of Contract Debts art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607.  This 
was the first effort to limit the collection of debt by forcible means.  While the 
early twentieth century prohibition on the use of force to collect debts in the 
Hague Conventions was partial, it represented an important step towards the 
prohibition, not without caveats, of the use of force under international law.  See 
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.”).  
17 Barton Legum, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794, 
95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 202, 203–05 (2001). 
18 William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed 
Countries: Reflections on the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/4
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in modern BITs concerning dispute settlement as well as national 
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, the minimum standard 
of treatment, and expropriation each have antecedents in FCNs 
and nineteenth-century commercial treaties. 
International claims commissions and ad hoc tribunals dealing 
with the property of foreigners are a type of ‘second cousins’ of 
investor-state arbitration.  These commissions were characterized 
by an essential state-to-state mode of adjudication;19 the 
establishment of semi-permanent decision-making bodies with 
certain levels of ‘independency’ of their members;20 and consensual 
third-party adjudication, which many times involved contentious 
(and sometimes dramatic) events.  Suffice it to say that the latter 
feature required intense diplomatic efforts or—quite frequently—
what was termed as “‘gunboat diplomacy,’” a now prohibited 
manifestation of self-help in international affairs.21 
Domestic systems also played (and still play) a fundamental 
role in disputes over foreign investment, in large part because at 
the core of such disputes tends to be the relationship of property. 
National authorities have original jurisdiction over this 
relationship.  They may decide any conflicts originating as a 
consequence of the state’s involvement in the recognition, 
regulation, affectation, extinction, etc., unless the state consents to 
an international form of dispute settlement.  Internationalization 
was—in part—also a response to demands to complement some of 
                                                     
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–8 (2006) (explaining the traditional diplomatic protections 
available to foreign investors harmed by breaches of international law). 
19 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the 
United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 265 (1988) (describing the 1983 draft’s 
state-to-state dispute provisions); see also ROBERT RENBERT WILSON, UNITED STATES 
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 104, 104–12 (1960) (discussing 
property protections in pre-1923 commercial treaties). 
20 According to Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, judges are 
“independent” when they are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and 
serve fixed terms.  Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in 
International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). 
21 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 830, 880 (2006) (“[U]nder traditional state-based principles of international 
law—i.e., those from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries—the safe-
conduct promise was enforceable through the offended sovereign’s right to make 
war in the event of a breach.”).  See SIR JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919–
1979: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE 39 (1981) (“Gunboat 
diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of 
war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an 
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the 
jurisdiction of their own state.”). 
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the perceived deficiencies of domestic courts and in some cases the 
inexistence of competent justice systems.22  Especially in the eyes of 
capital exporter countries, national courts—particularly in the 
recently de-colonialized world—raised concerns as to capacity for 
speedy, neutral, and technical resolution of claims.23  That was a 
convenient framing too since, perhaps, they were worried of 
rollbacks of concessions and nationalizations. 
Thus, in theory, prior to the expansion of investor-state 
arbitration, the cases involving property of aliens abroad were 
initially treated as domestic conflicts, unless the parties had agreed 
on compulsory arbitration.  Only after spending economic, 
diplomatic, or military resources could international adjudication 
follow in a mercantilist (state-to-state) mode.  Only states could 
bring claims following the formal rules derived from general 
international law, commonly known as exhaustion of local 
remedies, espousal of claims, and diplomatic protection.24  Dr. 
Aron Broches, often referred to as the founding father of ICSID, 
explains the fundamental change brought by the Convention in the 
following way: 
                                                     
22 Adjudication was rarely the result of pre-established dispute settlement 
arrangements, and very often the result of international agreements or 
compromises entered into by states after the alleged illicit conduct.  More than 
once, those agreements to adjudicate disputes that affected the economic interests 
of nationals abroad were the product of forcefully negotiated concessions or 
settlement or peace agreements.  See Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to 
International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 692 (1907) (describing the “steps taken by 
England, Germany and Italy in . . . 1902, against Venezuela for the settlement of 
claims of various sorts”).  But see generally MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007) 
(arguing that the use of force to collect Venezuelan debt was exceptional and not 
motivated solely by default). 
23 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 6 (2001) 
(“Rightly or wrongly, the national courts of one of the disputing parties are not 
perceived as sufficiently impartial.”). 
24 Some argue that the exhaustion of local remedies is also a substantive 
obligation.  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Waiver and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
Rule in NAFTA Jurisprudence, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST 
ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 253, 259 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004) 
(“The proceduralists have won the debate.  It is clear that acts outside denials of 
justice can form the basis for international claims and that state parties can waive 
the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies.  Moreover, in the investment 
treaty context that fact is explicit—most treaties set forth a list of potential 
violations, such as a failure to provide national treatment or an expropriation not 
in accordance with international law.”) 
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From the legal point of view, the most striking feature of 
the [ICSID] Convention is that it firmly establishes the 
capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed 
directly against a State in an international forum, thus 
contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as 
a subject of international law.25 
In fact, the private right of action for damages enabled (and 
pioneered) by ICSID navigates the contours of private and public 
law, contractual and general rights and obligations, individual and 
State participation, and national and international law.  It does so 
by borrowing elements from different legal structures,26 including 
public and private international law,27 international arbitration and 
ADR,28 and international relations and diplomacy.29  Some of these 
                                                     
25 Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, 
ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 198 
(1995) [hereinafter Broches, ESSAYS] (footnote omitted).  The word striking, of 
course, was an exaggeration.  Individuals had access to international tribunals 
prior to ICSID (e.g. Central American Court of Justice).  See Manley O. Hudson, 
The Central American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 759, 769–770, 772–773 (1932) 
(describing individual access to the Central American Court of Justice). 
26 The ICSID Convention came into force in October 1966.  The rules and 
regulations were modeled on different sources.  See Antonio R. Parra, The 
Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, 22 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 55, 55–57 (2007) 
(describing the creation of ICSID, and its rules and regulations and noting that the 
rules “also drew inspiration from, among other sources, the Statute and Rules of 
the World Court, the International Law Commission’s 1958 Model Rules on 
Arbitral Procedure and the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 1962 Rules for 
Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between 
Two Parties of Which Only One is a State”). 
27 The system borrows important legal infrastructure from international law. 
Irrespective of whether or not an international investment agreement (“IIA”), 
contract, or investment law refers to international law as the law applicable to the 
merits of the dispute, international law will be the law governing the dispute to 
the extent that what is at stake is the international responsibility of a state.  The 
tools available under public international law for the interpretation and the 
application of a treaty also determine formal elements of jurisdiction, competence, 
attribution, and reparation.  See Yas Banifatemi, The Law Applicable in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: 
A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 191 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) (explaining the 
choice of law process in international arbitration). 
28 Investor-state arbitration borrows from international arbitration and ADR 
the idea of technical specialization to deal with matters wherein the technical 
complexity surpasses the knowledge of generalist or parochial judges.  It also 
borrows the idea of procedural fairness and territorial ‘neutrality’ reflected in 
institutions such as the party appointed arbitrator/conciliator and, in the case of 
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fundamental characteristics were outlined at the outset of the 
negotiations of the ICSID Convention as follows: 
a recognition by [s]tates of the possibility of direct access by 
private individuals and corporations to an international 
tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with 
Governments; 
a recognition by [s]tates that agreements made by them 
with private individuals and corporations to submit such 
disputes to arbitration are binding international 
undertakings; 
the provision of international machinery for the conduct of 
arbitration, including the availability of arbitrators, 
methods for their selection and rules for the conduct of the 
arbitral proceeding; 
provision for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration.30  
This brief background is useful to launch the three most 
common justifications used to defend investor-state arbitration.  
When dissected, the three sources support different 
                                                     
the ICSID system, delocalized arbitration to ensure the recognition, enforcement, 
and execution of the arbitration even against the losing party’s will.  See Parra, 
supra note 26, at 60 (describing how Rule 6(2) was changed because arbitrators 
were increasingly required to disclose any past interaction or relationship with 
parties); W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: 
Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 185, 185-92 
(2009) (arguing that ADR and international arbitration are both “adversarial” to 
each other and supplement each other, and often are pushed to come to 
settlements by the threat of compulsory arbitration). 
29 Reputation and the preference for negotiated outcomes are important 
elements of international relations practice.  Under the eyes of the planner, in an 
internationally interdependent world, a trustworthy reputation is necessary to 
attract FDI.  Reputation and cooperation are important for assessing 
trustworthiness of international actors and increase the likelihood that they will 
abide by the terms of negotiated agreements.  These features are evident in clear 
mandates for registration to assess formal elements of jurisdiction and ripeness of 
claims.  See Aron Broches, Theory and Practice of Treaty Registration with Particular 
Reference to Agreements of the International Bank (1957), in Broches, ESSAYS, supra 
note 25, at 99, 129–58 (examining the attitude of the ICJ and its failure to address 
treaty non-registration by reviewing five cases where the issue of registration 
should have been raised but was ignored). 
30 A. BROCHES, GEN. COUNS., NOTE TRANSMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES (1961), 
reprinted in INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP., 2 THE HISTORY OF THE 
SID CONVENTION: PART 1 at 1, 2 (1968) [hereinafter BROCHES NOTE]. 
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understandings of what the primary function of the remedy is, 
emphasize a different theory of compensation promoted by the 
remedy, and sustain different views of the relationship between 
the remedy enabled and the nature of rights conferred under the 
international investment instruments. 
3.2. Procedural Justice: Guarantee of Bargaining Power 
The particular dynamics found in asymmetric conflicts over 
property relationships involving states and foreign investors have 
served as the main justification for investor-state arbitration.  
Under this view, the remedy represents a response to calls for 
access to effective justice in the form of readily available, 
competent, neutral, and procedurally informal (compared to the 
formalities imposed by public international law) processes for 
resolving disputes involving investments abroad.31  Ideologically, 
it reflects the response to a particular way of problematizing a type 
of economic conflicts and the variability (and specificity) of factors 
involved.32  In response to these demands, investor-state 
arbitration institutionalizes a form—perhaps the preferred 
method—of international investment disputes settlement.33 
Under this justification, the invocation of responsibility by a 
non-state actor against a host state is designed primarily to 
respond to concerns over procedural justice.  Chiefly, the remedy is 
designed to grant direct access to seek a settlement or award that 
confirms that a disrupted investment by the hands of the state had 
value.34  Arbitration, the dispute settlement technique and 
framework of dialogue, is consensual, and attempts to encourage 
negotiated outcomes (i.e., amicable settlement between the 
                                                     
31 See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 
29 (1915) (“[I]t is clear that by international law there is no legal duty incumbent 
upon the state to extend diplomatic protection.  Whether such a duty exists 
toward the citizen is a matter of municipal law of his own country, the general 
rule being that even under municipal law the state is under no legal duty to 
extend diplomatic protection.”). 
32 See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation 
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981) (arguing 
that disputes in general are social constructs). 
33 See, e.g., id.; Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 232 (1995) (“This new world of international arbitration is 
one in which the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the 
defendant.”).   
34 See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: 
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 225 (1993). 
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parties).35  The procedural rules establish a basic methodology that 
ensures that a party cannot block the proceedings by refusing to 
cooperate in the tribunal constitution36 and ensures a basic formal 
equality during the process of adjudication.37 
Under this first claim, the threat of ‘neutral’ international 
dispute settlement means that even the sturdiest state can become 
attractive for investors, including states who had not originally 
stipulated international forms of dispute settlement in individual 
contracts.  This feature, also known as open-ended consent to 
arbitration, obviates the need for investors to negotiate the 
internationalization of a regime consisting of arbitration and an 
international law clause into individual contracts with the host 
state. 
Professor Michael Reisman presents the concept of investor-
state arbitration as primarily a remedy to facilitate negotiated 
outcomes and guarantee bargaining power in a fundamentally 
asymmetrical context as follows: 
A common feature of foreign direct investment is that the 
investor has sunk substantial capital in the host [s]tate, and 
cannot withdraw it or simply suspend delivery and write 
off a small loss as might a trader in a long-term trading 
relationship.  The Romans said “potior est conditio 
defendentis,” and this is likely to be the situation in foreign 
direct investment.  So rather than having an equality of 
bargaining power in an exclusively negotiation-based 
regime, parity will cease and things will tilt heavily in favor 
of the respondent [s]tate.  Unless, that is, both sides 
appreciate that if negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration 
will follow.38 
                                                     
35 See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings, r. 21, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ 
RulesMain.jsp (governing pre-hearing conference) [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration 
Rules]. 
36 See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at art. 38 (allowing Chairman to 
appoint an arbitrator ninety days after notice at the request of one party, and after 
“consulting both parties as far as possible”).  See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 35, at r. 4 (governing appointment of arbitrators by the chairman of the 
administrative council).  
37 See, e.g., ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at r. 19–28. 
38 Reisman, supra note 28, at 190–91. 
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3.3. Corrective Justice: Compartmentalization of International 
Economic Conflicts 
The second justificatory source, corrective justice, adopts the 
stereotype followed by some international law experts that power 
is a force that works in opposition to law.  Prior to the expansion of 
investor-state arbitration, international conflicts over the treatment 
of foreign property experienced the direct involvement of the 
states of nationality of the investor and the investment’s host.  In 
such context—according to the second foundational idea 
underpinning the remedy—the involvement would inescapably 
favor powerful states over weaker ones.  With the increasing 
complexity of international relations, this could give rise to 
paralyzing diplomatic confrontations and destructive zero-sum 
games between states affected by the conflict.39 
Investor-State arbitration, however, attempts to create a 
mutually beneficial setting for several of the parties involved.  It 
does so by compartmentalizing potentially daunting conflicts 
between states into individual disputes between investors and 
states.  This—some may argue—helps to “de-politicize” 
internationally distressing conflicts, liberating a tense space 
between states to be employed for building constructive 
relationships.40  This approach assumes that law tames the role of 
power in world politics, favoring long-term cooperation, stability 
and diplomatic solidarity. 
As the goal-based argument goes, to compartmentalize 
conflicts and relax state-to-state relations, a less formal order (as 
compared to the system of adjudication of public international law) 
and, to some extent, more transparent process (as compared to the 
informal efforts that the WB would provide at request of member 
states) was “institutionalized.”41  Thus, by allowing an individual 
                                                     
39 Cf. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 
100 AM. J.INT’L L. 64, 65 (2006) (“[L]egal rules and institutions did not arise out of 
the power of the coercive state but, rather, out of custom, consensus, and private 
ordering.”) 
40 See Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary 
Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 271, 273 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012) 
(arguing that the concept of de-politicization may be used in four different 
fashions but “has no self-evident use for conceptualising and resolving modern 
challenges”).   In this article, I take the meaning officially advanced by ICSID’s 
leadership and not other possible uses of the same concept. 
41 BROCHES NOTE, supra note 30, at 6.  
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or a corporation to proceed directly against a state in an 
international forum, the remedy should help to reduce the 
interference of the state of nationality of the investor in the 
domestic affairs of the host state.  This should also be reassuring 
for the host state because it allows it to avoid the acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another, often more powerful, state.42 
With a remedy to directly enforce breaches of international 
investment law, the foreign investor improves her position by 
having a better ability to assess the risks in investing abroad, and, 
if the reasonable operating assumptions are affected by excessive 
government intervention, the foreign investor may be able to 
succeed and obtain reparation in an independent legal process.43  
By obviating the need for diplomatic protection, the investor has 
much more control, including the ability to influence the outcome 
by bringing arguments that better fit her reality and appointing 
neutral arbitrators. The investor is also insulated from the 
arbitrariness of the practice of diplomatic protection.  In this sense, 
under this second functional source, investor-state arbitration 
follows a corrective justice rationale because it is more interested in 
the “victim’s” perspective, i.e., the entity that allegedly suffered 
injustice at the hands of the infracting state.44  
For the host state and the state of nationality of the investor the 
benefits are also clear:  not only can the respondent avoid—in 
theory—facing the state of nationality of the investor (often more 
powerful given investment trends) in the dispute, but both could 
focus on building constructive relationships and avoiding foul 
claims over money.45  This individual-state mode of dispute 
                                                     
42 Id. 
43 See Philip C. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46 
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 908 (1946) (describing the pre-ICSID limitations on foreign 
investor’s power).  See also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 277–78 (6th ed., 1963) (arguing that state-to-
state procedure “is far from satisfactory from the individual’s point of view.  He 
has no remedy of his own, and the state to which he belongs may be unwilling to 
take up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits”). 
44 See George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—And Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 279, 287 (2002) (discussing the history of modern corrective justice theory, 
and arguing that “strict liability—liability for harmed caused by risk-taking 
without wrongdoing—is a fact of modern tort law”). 
45 See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L. Q. REV. 438, 
454 (1947), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 487, 504 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (arguing that the 
espousal of a claim by the state tends to impart the complexion of political 
controversy and of unfriendly action); see also ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at 
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settlement will reduce the possibility of abuses by powerful states 
by prohibiting the espousal of the claim unless, of course, the 
respondent state fails to abide by and comply with the pecuniary 
obligations of the awards.46  This goal of de-politicization also 
requires building a specific legal and institutional infrastructure.  
This infrastructure represented a historical quid pro quo:  the private 
right of action and the commitment of states to recognize and 
enforce pecuniary obligations as if they were the final judgment of 
a national court were paralleled by the obligation on the part of the 
state of nationality of the investor to exercise restraint and not to 
intervene in the dispute.47 
In short, this second defense of investor-state arbitration 
originates from the attempts to compartmentalize international 
economic conflicts and the consequent insulation of inter-state 
politics through a formal international legal process.48  Under this 
view, the remedy is chiefly a system of protection for foreign 
                                                     
art. 27 (“No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one if its nationals and another 
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to 
arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have 
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.”). 
46 See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 416 (“[T]he arbitration procedure provided 
by ICSID offers considerable advantages to both sides.  The foreign investor no 
longer depends on the uncertainties of diplomatic protection but obtains direct 
access to an international remedy.  The dispute settlement process is depoliticized 
and subjected to objective legal criteria . . . . In turn, by consenting to ICSID 
arbitration the host State obtains the assurance that it will not be exposed to an 
international claim by the investor’s home State, as long as it abides by the 
award.”) 
47 ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at art. 54 (capturing the particular 
advantage of ICSID, since its methodology also allows for what is called a 
delocalized system of enforcement preventing the intervention of domestic courts 
in reviewing ICSID decisions).   See also Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor & Michael 
Nolan, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 1 (2006) (quoting 
Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Ad Hoc Committee Decision of December 22, 1989, 5 ICSID REV.—
FILJ 95 (1990)) (stating that the ICSID Convention “excludes any attack on the 
award in the national courts”). 
48 See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a Greater Depoliticization of 
Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Kevin W. 
Lu, Gero Verheyen & Srilal M. Perera eds., 2009); see also Robert B. Shanks, Lessons 
in the Management of Political Risk: Infrastructure Projects (A Legal Perspective), in 
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK 85, 93 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1998) 
(“The politically sensitive nature of infrastructure projects [and] their relative 
vulnerability to government interference . . .  heightens the importance of . . . 
dispute resolution procedure.”). 
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investors and de-politicization of investment disputes.  This view 
of investor-state arbitration was adopted by Ibrahim Shihata.  The 
former Secretary-General argued that the remedy enabled by the 
ICSID Convention “provide[s] developing countries with a 
response which, compared to the Calvo Doctrine, is both more 
adequate in the depoliticization of disputes and more effective in 
the encouragement of foreign investment, without inviting the 
abuses of diplomatic protection.”49 
3.4. Deterrence: Prevention of Opportunistic Behavior of States 
The post-War stabilization efforts resulted in the continued 
desire on the part of western policy-makers to involve private 
enterprise in economic activity and to encourage private 
investment to eventually replace aid programs and state 
subsidization.  At the same time, these efforts contributed to 
understanding risk management and the creation of agencies to 
address non-commercial risks like inconvertibility, expropriation, 
civil war, revolution, or insurrection.50 
These ideas of risk reduction, free market, and economic 
efficiency underscore the third functional goal of investor-state 
arbitration: prevention of opportunistic behavior of states.  
Informed by ‘neoclassical’ economic theory, some economists and 
development specialists advocated—successfully—for the 
extension of a private right of action for damages as a risk reducing 
commitment.  Under this theory, private FDI leads to economic 
growth and economic development.  In order to encourage FDI, 
well-defined property rights adopted in different instruments of 
protection (i.e., relationship-specific contracts, foreign investment 
laws, or investment treaties) shall be complemented by access to a 
functional dispute-settlement forum.  Without a proper forum, 
                                                     
49 Shihata, supra note 48, at 23.  See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID 
Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009) 
(noting the some countries’ opposition to the ICSID Convention because “it 
implied curtailment of the judicial branch’s monopoly of the administration of 
justice, and would grant foreign investors a legally privileged position”). 
50 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, THE OVERSEAS 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2–3 
(2013), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-567.pdf (stating that Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) insures investments against currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence). 
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property rights’ enforcement would be unreliable, and unreliability 
creates higher risks as well as lower incentives to invest.51 
Under this third justificatory source, investor-state arbitration 
is first a mechanism for enforcement of international commitments 
that would deter opportunistic and rapacious behavior or capture 
on the part of governments against foreign investors.  The remedy 
is therefore considered to be the enforcement side that minimizes 
some risks for long-term commitment of resources.  The quid pro 
quo in this strategy requires states to surrender original jurisdiction 
for potential claims to international investment dispute settlement 
in the hope of attracting sustained fluxes of FDI that will increase 
the possibilities for economic development.  For that, the 
theoretical focus of the remedy is deterrence; the process of 
economic compensation to affected investors serves mainly as an 
ex post remedy in order to assure that ex ante potential wrongdoers 
will weigh the costs of injury against the benefits of productive 
activity. 
Under this third claim, investor-state arbitration enables the 
use of private rights of action for damages as a risk-reducing 
commitment.  The argument follows that this deters the 
opportunistic behavior of states, having in mind—in the long 
run—incentivizing foreign investment.  This theory is expressed in 
the analysis of law and economic scholars like Professor Alan O. 
Sykes: 
[T]he utility of a private right of action for money damages 
is obvious.  To see why, consider a world of BITs without 
the private action.  In the event of an uncompensated 
expropriation or similar action, an investor would have to 
lobby [her] own government to take some sort of action 
against the violator state.  The investor might be politically 
inefficacious in this process for any number of reasons.  
[She] might be unable to offer enough political benefits in 
return for the governments’ assistance.  [Her] government 
might have diplomatic reasons for declining to take any 
action or for declining to retaliate against the violator in any 
effective way.  And even if some retaliation were 
forthcoming, the retaliation might do nothing to 
                                                     
51 See BROCHES NOTE, supra note 30, at 244 (quoting one of the delegates 
participating in the ICSID Convention negotiation, “economic development could 
not be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would not obtain 
capital unless they provided adequate [legal] guarantees”). 
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compensate the investor for [her] losses.  Considerable risk 
for investors would remain, and the risk premium on new 
investments would reflect it.  A credible promise of 
monetary compensation to investors, by contrast, in an 
amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much further to 
reduce investment risk and to achieve the developing 
countries’ goal of lowering the cost of foreign capital.52 
In summary, functionally investor-state arbitration can be 
conceptualized in three different ways:  first, as a method for 
investment dispute settlement; second, as a system to achieve 
legalization towards an increased ‘de-politicization’ of investment 
disputes; and, third, as a mechanism for the removal of 
impediments to the free international flow of private investment 
that are posed by non-commercial risks.  This distinction also 
reaffirms the three dimensions of investor-state arbitration and 
stresses particular theories of compensation:  first, as the preferred 
specialized international method for investment dispute settlement 
concerned with procedural justice; second, as a (self-contained and 
delocalized in the case of ICSID) process to deciding legal disputes 
between states and investors allowing for direct corrective justice; 
and third, as a multilateral enforcement mechanism concerned 
with deterrence of conducts affecting investments abroad.  Of 
course, these three distinctions are somehow oversimplified, but I 
believe they capture the basic intuitions that may animate the 
arbitrators’ reasoning.  The following section discusses how each of 
these different conceptions may animate a different functional 
relationship with treaty rights under international law. 
4. NATURE OF RIGHT: FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
In this section, I use the debate around the operation of a 
countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state 
in the investor-state context to show how the three approaches 
may imply different functional relationships with the rights 




                                                     
52 Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic 
Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 643 (2005). 
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4.1. Background 
The debate arose in the context of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment provisions.53  After a long-
standing disagreement regarding the specific meaning of the treaty 
provisions, the Mexican Congress approved a controversial excise 
tax on the use of fructose on soft drinks.  Instead of collecting 
revenue, the tax indirectly forced soft drink producers to use 
Mexican sugar by excessively taxing the sale of soft drinks made 
with fructose while exempting those made with cane sugar.  The 
measure openly discriminated against fructose producers in 
Mexico (almost exclusively owned by U.S. investors). 
Four U.S. companies started three investor-state arbitration 
proceedings on behalf of their controlled and locally-incorporated 
subsidiaries.  Since Mexico’s efforts to consolidate these claims 
failed, the cases were conducted in separate proceedings.  The 
claimants argued that the tax was, among other things, inconsistent 
with Mexico’s national treatment obligation under the investment 
protection provisions of NAFTA. 
During the investor-State proceedings adjudicating these 
claims, Mexico conceded the discriminatory character of the tax 
but argued that it was a “legitimate countermeasure” that 
precluded wrongfulness adopted in response to what Mexico 
characterized as a prior U.S. violation of intra-state obligations 
under NAFTA.  The three tribunals decided that the tax was 
discriminatory, in violation of the national treatment obligation, 
and that Mexico’s actions entailed liability.  However, the tribunals 
faced the question of whether a countermeasure for the alleged 
prior violations by the United States could be directly applicable to 
investors.  While reaching the same practical outcomes, the three 
tribunals decided the case differently, sparking a doctrinal debate 
regarding the nature of investors’ rights.54 
Such controversy has been elegantly dissected by Martins 
Paparinskis as follows:   
                                                     
53 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
54 See Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO–
NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L., 197, 197–200 (2006) 
(discussing the complexity of parallel proceedings within different international 
frameworks, which can sometimes yield inconsistencies). 
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[e]ven though the host state may in principle apply 
countermeasures to investment obligations, their effect and 
limits depend on the nature of the investors’ rights.  
Countermeasures are relative in effect and may not be 
adopted otherwise than in response to a prior breach of 
international law by the entity to which the obligation is 
owed.55   
In his brilliant contribution addressing this topic, he explains 
that adopting the analytical perspective of investors’ rights either 
as right-holders (by reference to human and consular rights 
analogies), beneficiaries (by reference to the law of treaties rules on 
third states analogies), or agents (by reference to diplomatic 
protection analogies), has the following implications: 
From the perspective of delegated diplomatic protection, 
the host state owes primary obligations only to the home 
state, and the investor only invokes responsibility for their 
breach; consequently, countermeasures can be successfully 
opposed to the only beneficiary of the obligation and can in 
principle successfully preclude wrongfulness, provided 
that other criteria are satisfied.  However, if the investor is 
also the beneficiary of the obligation (whether akin to a 
third party or as an entity with direct rights), then the 
precluding wrongfulness of countermeasures, while 
opposable to one beneficiary (the home state), is not 
opposable to the other beneficiary (the investor). 56 
4.2. Third-Party Rights: Access to Justice and Dispute Settlement 
As presented under the procedural justice approach, investor-
state arbitration serves fundamentally as a remedy to ensure access 
to justice, neutrality, and fairness by empowering individuals and 
corporations to directly participate in a dispute settlement 
process—arguably an option that may be unavailable to foreigners 
before domestic justice systems or elsewhere.  Without fully 
                                                     
55 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 632 (emphasis added).  
56 Id. Cf. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid 
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L 
ECON. L. J., 1, 68-70 (2014) (concluding “that investment treaty rights are granted 
to investors and home states on an interdependent basis, and interpretive 
authority is shared between the treaty parties, investor-state tribunals, and state-
to-state tribunals.”) 
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entering into the merits of such debate, it is fair to say that the 
defense of investor-state arbitration under this basis can be taken 
with a grain of salt.  For instance, it is often argued that investor-
state arbitration is not fair because decision-makers are not truly 
independent.57  According to some authors, “the development of 
this new ‘common law of investment’ has been placed primarily in 
the hands of an exceedingly small pool of super-elite, like-minded 
international lawyers who operate largely divorced from any 
municipal political process.”58  Moreover, in part because of design 
elements (e.g., cost, capacity, access to expertise, etc.), investor-state 
arbitration is not truly accessible to the majority of the business 
community.59  Therefore, the investor-state may only serve the 
interests of large transnational corporations since in actuality the 
remedy is accessible to very few actors, and arguably only 
supports already empowered global economic participants. 
In any event, the direct invocation of responsibility by a non-
state actor against a host state in an arbitral setting under this 
perspective serves a fundamental task:  to provide foreigners 
investing abroad with a neutral, non-state forum for reparation 
that may increase access to justice and by implication equalize 
bargaining power between the sovereign and the regulated party. 
The majority decision of the tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico 
(Greenwood and Serrano de la Vega) may be paradigmatic of the 
impulse to think of investor-state arbitration as a remedy 
                                                     
57 See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International 
Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 85 (2012) (“Political scientists have 
recently analyzed several ways in which delegation of problems and conflicts to 
international courts shapes legal evolution. One important finding is that the 
extent of such delegation increases with two variables relating to the design of 
courts: judicial independence (which depends on the selection method and tenure 
of judges) and access.  Another important finding—which resonates with work 
done by lawyers on the impact of independent tribunals—is that access for 
private, non-state litigants and compulsory jurisdiction both contribute to judicial 
independence.”) (footnotes omitted).  See generally PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA 
OLIVET, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY & TRANSNAT’L INST., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: 
HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at http://corporateeurope.org/trade/ 
2012/11/profiting-injustice. 
58 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign 
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1550, 1611 (2009). 
59 See Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 
COMP. POL. STUD. 22, 46 (2006) (noting that notwithstanding the increase of 
compulsory jurisdiction, international adjudicative bodies still have limited 
resources for the majority of the business community). 
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fundamentally concerned with access to justice and dispute 
settlement.  Functionally, the remedy formalizes a procedure that 
ensures a certain level of neutrality for addressing conflicts.  It 
gives the affected investors direct control over the claims, and 
ensures that proceedings can continue even without direct 
participation of the host state.  The following excerpt of Corn 
Products compares the investors’ own benefit of international 
obligations to the rights of a third party, and hence the remedy is a 
procedural endeavor primarily concerned with access to 
international justice: 
It has long been the case that international lawyers have 
treated as a fiction the notion that in diplomatic protection 
cases the State was asserting a right of its own—violated 
because an injury done to its national was in fact an injury 
to the State itself.  It was a necessary fiction, because 
procedurally only a State could bring an international 
claim, but the fact that it did not reflect substantive reality 
showed through not only in the juristic writing but also in 
various rules of law surrounding diplomatic protection 
claims . . . . However, there is no need to continue that 
fiction in a case in which the individual is vested with the 
right to bring claims of its own.  In such a case there is no 
question of the investor claiming on behalf of the State.  The 
State of nationality of the Claimant does not control the 
conduct of the case.  No compensation which [sic] is 
recovered will be paid to the State.  The individual may 
even advance a claim of which the State disapproves or 
base its case upon a proposition of law with which the State 
disagrees . . . . [Hence] an investor which brings a claim is 
seeking to enforce what it asserts are its own rights under 
the treaty and not exercising a power to enforce rights 
which are actually those of the State . . . .  [T]his is a case 
involving the rights of a third party and not merely its 
interests.  Mexico owed obligations . . . separate from the 
obligations it owed to the United States . . . [hence] 
countermeasures could operate to preclude the 
wrongfulness of the HFCS tax vis-à-vis the United States 
[but not vis-à-vis the investor].60 
                                                     
60 Corn Products. Int’l, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/01 (NAFTA), Decision on Responsibility, ¶¶ 170–76 (Jan. 15, 2008), 
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4.3. Direct Rights: De-Politicization and Compensation 
The specialization and de-politicization functions of the 
remedy are both concerned with its effects on conflict resolution.  
However, the de-politicization function is specifically concerned 
with the diplomatic relationship between the investor’s state of 
nationality of the investor and the host state of the investor.  Under 
this functional claim of the remedy, formalizing disputes without 
the involvement of the investor’s state of nationality results in 
equality among states, limiting arbitrariness and “abuses of 
diplomatic protection.”61  The assumption is that without investor-
state arbitration, foreign investment disputes will be relegated to 
the sphere of power politics, and dominant global powers would 
reign.62  Hence the arbitration format (investors-state) and relief 
(damages only) help to frame political and economic conflicts in 
stable ways for the pursuit of larger policy goals.63 
Of course, the arbitration process cannot always guarantee 
fairness.  International realists, as well as critical legal scholars, 
have long pointed to the ways in which international law itself is 
instrumental to and shaped by power.64  This idea may reinforce 




61 See Shihata, supra note 48, at 2, 23 (noting that in the past century abuse of 
diplomatic protection drove many countries to require all disputes be resolved 
exclusively in domestic courts, and that arbitration offers a solution because 
“[r]esort to ICSID precludes the investor's state from exercising diplomatic 
protection or instituting an international claim unless the host state fails to comply 
with the award rendered in such dispute”).  
62 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 207 
(2d ed. 2004) (stating that one feature of the IIAs “is that they are made between 
unequal partners,” which demonstrates this dichotomy in the context of ICSID 
and IIA since it relates to the relationship between strong, capital-exporter states 
that may use power diplomacy to force weaker, capital-importer states to settle in 
unequal terms)  (citation omitted).  See also ICSID DATABASE OF BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2014) (follow “Bilateral Investment Treaties” hyperlink) (presenting 
an organized database of BITs listed by country). 
63 See Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 36, 36 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (“[I]nstitutions are 
created by political actors as structuring or ordering devices, as mechanisms for 
framing politics in ways that enshrine predominant notions of legitimate agency, 
stabilise individual and collective purposes, and facilitate the pursuit of 
instrumental goals.”). 
64 For a classic discussion on the role of power, see KENNETH N. WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (arguing that international rules are the 
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the stereotype that power is a force that works in opposition to 
law.65  At the same time, the remedy may serve as substitutes that 
allow domestic power brokers to “exit local jurisdictions with poor 
institutions,” or to affect judicial politics around specific normative 
issues by extending corrective options to foreign investors.66 
The correct interpretative exercise to determine whether direct 
invocation of the investor should be viewed as a third party or as 
an entity with direct rights requires a complex analysis reaching 
into the broader architecture of investment law.67  I leave that 
discussion to more able scholars.  My point is simply that under a 
direct rights approach of the remedy, the emphasis is in the 
corrective nature of the remedy.  This function opens the possibility 
of material compensation without distressing other relationships 
between states (or states and its nationals) by reducing the spaces 
for arbitrariness and abuses that come with the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. 
In this sense, one can read the direct right to invoke 
responsibility as a mechanism to correct a breach to international 
commitments through payment of compensatory damages.  It 
allows the ‘victim’ or investor who allegedly suffered the wrong at 
the hands of the authorities, to obtain a finding that a breach has 
occurred and, if it is the case, possibly receive a direct payment of 
damages for the violation by the host state without any 
involvement of the home state.  This picture of investor-state 
arbitration, as primarily a corrective mechanism for foreign 
                                                     
pronouncements of powerful states and are subject to change along with 
fluctuations in state power).  See also John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of 
International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5, 7 (1995) (arguing that international 
institutions cannot have independent effects on state behavior).  
65 See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 39, at 74 (“[S]tate behavior and 
associated international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law, 
but because international law mirrors the interests of powerful states, 
international law is merely an epiphenomenon of underlying power.”). 
66 See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108, 122–23 (2005) 
(arguing that “institutions that lie at the intersection of the domestic and 
international spheres” can allow a dispute to escape local institutions).  For a 
clarification of this argument, see Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and 
Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners Saga, 5 MEX. L. REV. 199, 202 (2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042798 (“[S]upranational adjudicatory 
bodies may affect domestic politics by empowering and expanding remedies 
available to foreign investors.”) 
67 Martins Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of Countermeasures, 
79 BRIT. YEARBOOK INT’L L. 264, 297–301, 304–305 (2008). 
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investors, is adopted by Professor Lowenfeld in a separate opinion 
in the case referred to above:  Corn Products v. Mexico.  He takes 
issue with the majority opinion’s characterization of investors’ 
rights as being similar to third-party rights, and stresses the de-
politicization role of the remedy in the following passage: 
[T]he essential feature of investor-[s]tate arbitration, as it 
has developed since the ICSID Convention . . . is that 
controversies between foreign investors and host states are 
insulated from political and diplomatic relations between 
states.  In return for agreeing to independent international 
arbitration, the host state is assured that the state of the 
investor’s nationality (as defined) will not espouse the 
investor’s claim or otherwise intervene in the controversy 
between an investor and a host state, for instance by 
denying foreign assistance or attempting to pressure the 
host state into some kind of settlement.  Correspondingly, 
the state of the investor’s nationality is relieved of the 
pressure of having its relations with the host state disturbed 
or distorted by a controversy between its national and the 
host state. . . .  The paradigm in investor-States disputes, . . . 
is a dispute between the first party (nearly always the 
investor) as plaintiff, and the second party (nearly always 
the host state or state agency) as respondent. There is no 
third party.68 
Moreover, a different tribunal in Cargill v. Mexico (Pryles, 
Caron, and McRae) analyzing the exact same issue also stressed the 
corrective function of the remedy.  After examining the arguments 
posed by the respondent, it concluded: 
[I]t is the investor that is named in the operating paragraph 
or ‘dispositive’ of the award. . . .  [the granting of rights 
under the investment treaty] is no different from rights of 
individuals within many municipal legal systems.  That the 
origin of individual rights may be found in the act of a 
sovereign, or in the joint act of sovereigns, does not negate 
the existence of the rights conferred. . . . [I]t is the investor 
that acts upon and benefits from the obligations . . . it is the 
                                                     
68 Corn Products. Int’l, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/01 (NAFTA), Separate Opinion of Andreas F. Lowenfeld , ¶ 1 – 4 
(Jan. 15, 2008), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1012_En&caseId=C29. 
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investor that institutes the claim, that calls a tribunals into 
existence, and that is the named party in all respects to the 
resulting proceedings and award.69 
4.4. Delegated Rights: Risk Assessment and Conflict Prevention 
The final archetypal function of investor-state arbitration as a 
remedy of international investment law is to serve as a source of 
certainty and to incentivize flows of FDI.70  This is anchored in the 
belief that “the prospect of involvement in . . . [investor-state 
arbitration] proceedings will work as a deterrent to the actions 
which give rise to the institution of proceedings”.71 
The embedded idea in this conceptualization—investors as 
rational decision makers—has been most recently challenged by 
the findings of behavioral economists and social psychologists, 
which show that human decisions are not purely rational.72  
Instead, they are susceptible to systematic biases and errors, and 
they are greatly affected by internal processes that do not 
correspond to a cost-benefit analysis.73  Similarly, scholars have 
long argued that law-related considerations often play a 
surprisingly minor role in the organization and implementation of 
business affairs and in decisions to invest.74  Again, I leave this 
                                                     
69 Cargill, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, 
Award, ¶ 425–26 (Sep. 18, 2009), available at http://www.italaw.com/. 
70 See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, ¶ 10.  See also Vandevelde, supra note 
19, at 258 (describing “binding third-party arbitration of investment disputes” as a 
mechanism to promote fluxes of FDI). 
71 Shihata, supra note 48, at 9 (emphasis added). 
72 See generally Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David. G. Victor, 
The Behavioral Psychology of Elite Decision Making: Implications for Political Science, 
UCSD Sch. Int’l Relations & Pacific Stud., Oct. 28, 2011, at 1, available at 
polisci2.ucsd.edu/dhughes/research/Elites.pdf. 
73 Id. 
74 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 62 (1963) (“[W]hile detailed planning and legal 
sanctions play a significant role in some exchanges between businesses, in many 
business exchanges their role is small.”).  See also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical 
View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985) (“Contract planning and contract 
law, at best, stand at the margin of important long-term continuing business 
relations.  Business people often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting 
contracts, pay much attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a 
legal approach to business relationships.”). 
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debate for another time and here only refer to other important 
works in the area.75 
The interpretation of the function of the remedy as primarily an 
element of deterrence emphasizes its utility for business planning 
and ex ante conflict prevention.  It stresses that by agreeing to grant 
a remedy states may be less likely to commit acts, which would 
give rise to conflict.  If so, there is a credibly “enforceable” 
commitment.  The remedy is precisely that enforcement side that 
acts as an (distant) element of inhibition.  The potential relief is 
monetary damages that serve to alleviate (some) concerns over the 
effective application of a ‘rule of law,’ especially in countries with 
difficult institutional environments (courts or otherwise). 
Under this conceptualization of the remedy, the right to invoke 
responsibility against the state is akin to a delegated right.  This 
right is assigned from the original right holders (the sovereigns) to 
an entire universe of economic participants, as defined by the 
international investment instrument.  The international 
agreements, while celebrated between states, establish a 
mechanism through which the parties can give up the international 
right to espouse the claims of a national before an international 
forum.  The delegation serves to protect—first and foremost—the 
investor by reducing the additional cost of higher risks (as reflected 
in the risk premium on new investments).  It creates more certainty 
in the investor’s decision process by limiting potential arbitrariness 
in the exercise of diplomatic protection, in the application of 
reprisals against a state found in violation and in the allocation of 
the (eventual) retaliation benefits to compensate the investor for its 
losses.  Under the view of the “delegated diplomatic protection” 
the host state owes primary obligations only to the home state, and 
the investor only invokes responsibility for their breach.  The right 
to invoke responsibility is the only carve-out from a “robust” and 
optimal regime of general international law.76  Such a regime is 
efficient since it ensures the proportionality of measures taken 
                                                     
75  See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael 
Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (trying to identify and address some of the systemic 
concerns, such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic 
accountability, a systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to 
respond to changes in economic circumstances). 
76 For this position, see Francisco González de Cossío, Investment Protection 
Rights: Substantive or Procedural?, 26 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 107 (2011). 
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when a state breaches an international obligation.77  Efficiency, of 
course, is a variable in risk assessment. 
The majority of the tribunal in the consolidated claims of ADM 
and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico (Cremades and 
Siqueiros) also analyzed whether countermeasures could be 
successfully opposed to the investors.  The Tribunal adopted a 
similar view of the remedy as the one describe above: 
The procedural obligation under . . . [the investment 
chapter of the treaty] to submit the dispute to arbitration—
which may arise from the breach of the primary obligations 
of the host State addressed in Section A—is owed directly 
to the beneficiary of the obligation, in this case the 
investors, who have opted in the present case, as a 
secondary right holder, to commence international 
arbitration proceedings under Chapter Eleven.  The power 
to bring international arbitral proceedings under Section B, 
makes the investor the holder of a procedural right, 
irrespective of whether this right may be suspended by the 
NAFTA Parties . . . . [It] establishes rights regarding the 
treatment of investors, but these rights are not owed by the 
host State to the investors, but to the investors’ home State.  
Therefore, the rights provided by Section A only exist at the 
international plane between NAFTA Parties.  Investors are 
the objects or mere beneficiaries of those rights.  
Accordingly, under Chapter Eleven, the Member States 
have an obligation to treat investors of the other NAFTA 
Parties under the standards addressed in Section A, but this 
obligation is only owed to the state of the investor’s 
nationality . . . It therefore follows that the only individual 
rights investors enjoy under Chapter Eleven is the 
procedural right under Section B to invoke responsibility of 
the host State.78 
In Arthur Rovine’s concurring opinion in the same case (ADM 
et al. v. Mexico), his skepticism of the position of his co-arbitrators 
reflects the pragmatism often associated with practitioners of the 
                                                     
77 See Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946, Decision 
of Dec. 9, 1978, 18 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 417, 445 (“Counter-measures . . . should 
be a wager on the wisdom, not on the weakness of the other Party.”). 
78 Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID AF 
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5,  Award, ¶¶ 177–79 (Nov. 21, 2007). 
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field.  He raised an important point engaging with it, in my modest 
view, very superficially:  “[W]hat difference does it make whether 
an investor’s right to redress for a wrong committed is . . . direct or 
derivative?”79  As it turns out, this question “is crucial in certain 
cases” such as consent to the commission of a wrongful act, 
waivers of obligations, or the application of countermeasures—the 
latter a fundamental issue in such dispute.80  However, Rovine also 
makes an emblematic point: “[a] right to a remedy is a substantive 
right.  Legal redress for the wrong committed is a substantive 
right.”81 
This is perhaps the main point behind this article.  While the 
problematic character of the “public-private” distinction has long 
been recognized by international legal theorists, the field pays little 
attention to the methodological limitations of the “procedural-
substantive” analysis.  As Paparinskis argues, the different 
conceptualization of the right to directly invoke responsibility 
against a state does not relieve the tribunal of “a diligent 
application of traditional techniques of legal reasoning.”82  These 
traditional techniques and the rules of state responsibility say very 
little about this substantive/procedural dichotomy.  The nature of 
investors’ rights is left to the particular primary rules.83  Attributing 
particular content to this primary rule, i.e., the right to directly 
invoke responsibility, is precisely what arbitrators do when 
interpreting the “procedural” dimension of international 
investment law.  In this sense, it is understandable why different 
arbitrators may ascribe different meaning to it based on the 
different functional reasons used historically to promote investor-
state arbitration.  Indeed, a careful analysis of the transformation of 
ICSID demonstrates how the argument justifying investor-state 
arbitration has changed and adopted different narratives, 
emphasizing at times its role to grant access to justice and de-
                                                     
79 Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID AF 
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine, ¶ 43 (Nov. 
21, 2007) [hereinafter Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine]. 
80 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 646. 
81 Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine, supra note 79, at ¶ 47. 
82 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 646. 
83 See James Crawford, ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 886–88 (2002) 
(discussing the articles in light of the bilateral state-to-state political climate that 
dominated at the time of their conception). 
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politicization or, more recently, its potential role in national 
economic development. 
The three-level theory presented here could be applicable and 
helpful to understanding other areas where tribunals show 
disagreement on fundamental aspects of the procedural dimension 
of international investment law, such as the type of non-
compensatory relief (e.g., injunctions, cessation, punitive damages) 
obtainable in investor-state arbitration.84  Of course, such questions 
may, in principle be determined by the investment instrument.  
Assuming a lack of interpretative guidance, one could understand 
why arbitrators contemplating deterrence as an important role of 
investor-state arbitration would be more willing to accept punitive 
damages (to raise the ‘cost’ of opportunistic behavior on the hands 
of states), or arbitrators concerned with procedural justice would 
more readily grant injunctions (to avoid the difficulties faced by 
foreigners before domestic courts), or why arbitrators concerned 
with corrective justice would accept to order cessations (to limit the 
effects of a wrong at the hands of authorities).  This is just another 
example of the ways in which the different functions of the remedy 
i.e., procedural justice, corrective justice, or deterrence speak to 
investment rights. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Justice Holmes once observed that “[l]egal obligations that exist 
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that 
are elusive to the grasp.”85  Without investor-state arbitration, 
investment law obligations would be more elusive and hence the 
unique role of this remedy in the future of foreign investment 
protection.  Understanding the foundations of the main 
enforcement mechanism of international investment law is not 
                                                     
84 See Jarrod Wong, The Misapprehension of Moral Damages in Investor-State 
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2013) (stating that 
reparation takes one of three forms:  Restitution, compensation, or satisfaction.  
Restitution focuses on reversing material injuries where possible; compensation 
remedies financially assessable injuries, whether material or moral, that are not 
made good by restitution; and satisfaction remedies non-financially assessable, 
often symbolic, injuries that represent affronts to the state).  See also Symposium, 
Remedies and Damages in Investment Arbitration, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE (2013), 
available at http://www.harvardilj.org/2013/03/hilj-symposium-2/ (featuring 
Ankita Ritwik, who gave a brief overview of remedies available in public 
international law). 
85 Ex parte The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).  
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only academically relevant, it has practical implications for 
arbitrators deciding concrete disputes, or lawyers advocating 
positions on behalf of their clients.  The subtle differences between 
the conceptualization of investor-state as an enforcement system 
i.e., procedural justice, corrective justice, or deterrence, may reach 
deeply as illustrated by the debate over the application of valid 
countermeasures under international law.  Of course, these 
representations are to some degree caricatures, but they capture 
basic intuitions that may animate the arbitrators’ reasoning.  These 
differences may also evidence some of the limitations of the 
substance-procedure dichotomy.  As illustrated by this work, the 
construction of substantive law entails assumptions about the 
procedures that will apply when that substantive law is ultimately 
enforced.86 
                                                     
86 See generally Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2009). 
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